Reminder: Off-chain solutions are not Bitcoin. You only have a true Bitcoin transaction if it is added and verified on the main Bitcoin blockchain. Permissioned side-chains and future Lightning hubs are attempts to centralize and steal away profit from miners who actually secure the network.
The only way to truly scale Bitcoin is to raise, remove or make the maximum blocksize adaptive. There will always be a market-based natural limit to how high blocks will get due to miners fear of losing a block reward. Any off-chain solution isn't a real scaling solution. Period.
In any chain split, expect me to side with whichever network that continues the design itself per Satoshis explanations. Bitcoin is not only code or hashpower. It does not depend on any one miner or developer, no matter their economic position. It is more than the network. It is a complete s /r/btc
In any chain split, expect me to side with whichever network that continues the design per Satoshis explanations. Bitcoin is not only code or hashpower. It does not depend on any one miner or developer, no matter their economic position. It is more than the network. It is a complete system. /r/btc
[uncensored-r/Bitcoin] Is this S2X attack by miners because they are terrified of side chains?
The following post by Eislemike is being replicated because some comments within the post(but not the post itself) have been silently removed. The original post can be found(in censored form) at this link: np.reddit.com/ Bitcoin/comments/7b5bbo The original post's content was as follows:
Side chains will cut out miner power almost completely. You could have a side chain like say vtc and if miners try to swing their shit around people can just punish them by lowering his revenue and moving to the vtc-like side chain. Their fixed cost will stay the same and they would be sufficiently penalized until they make it right. Miners would be forced to face the truth that they work for the bitcoin network and they can lose business (not to mention all of the altcoin developers and bag holders that side chains would have to terrify, no wonder this attack is happening, Bitcoin is going to get a lot better and harder attack. ). I'd love to hear if I'm missing something. I'm new to side chains and don't even know when they will be arriving, but it looks incredible.
Reminder: Off-chain solutions are not Bitcoin. You only have a true Bitcoin transaction if it is added and verified on the main Bitcoin blockchain. Permissioned side-chains and future Lightning hubs are attempts to centralize and steal away profit from miners who actually secure the network. /r/btc
Hypothetical question: in the event of a large world disrupting event (war)...
Hypothetically, in the event of a large war, the undersea cables that connect the world with internet could be severed. Satellite internet could be disabled through further wartime acts. We could end up with several discreet, independant internets that are not only separated by great firewalls, but also physically separated from each other. It's my understanding that the block chain would essentially continue in each internet pocket unhindered, but not synchronized. So what happened if after a prolonged period of isolation, let's say 5 years, the networks become reconnected. Would the two block chains "merge" If they merge, how would potentially conflicting transactions be handled? Double spending? Would one block chain fully overwrite the other? Effectively nullifying 5 years worth of transactions? Or would the possible overwrite only affect specific conflicting transactions? Or would they stay as separate discreet chains at that point? Would that mean someone who has keys today would then have keys for multiple sets of bitcoins on multiple block chains with the same keys? (so if I had 1btc today, after the "war" would I then have 1btc [Americas] 1btc [Asia] and 1btc [Europe])
What happens when a Global Power Grid Failure happens?
What if theres a Global Power Grid Failure and the whole Internet etc. shuts down? Where is the blockchain safed? Is there some form of backup or are the latest transactions lost ? Maybe i am also dumb , but is Bitcoin safe when all power is lost ?
A common sentiment is brewing online; a shared desire for the internet that might have been. After decades of corporate encroachment, you don't need to be a power user to realize that something has gone very wrong. In the early days of the internet, the future was bright. In that future, when you sent an instant message, it traveled directly to the recipient. When you needed to pay a friend, you announced a transfer of value to their public key. When an app was missing a feature you wanted, you opened up the source code and implemented it. When you took a picture on your phone, it was immediately encrypted and backed up to storage that you controlled. In that future, people would laugh at the idea of having to authenticate themselves to some corporation before doing these things. What did we get instead? Rather than a network of human-sized communities, we have a handful of enormous commons, each controlled by a faceless corporate entity. Hey user, want to send a message? You can, but we'll store a copy of it indefinitely, unencrypted, for our preference-learning algorithms to pore over; how else could we slap targeted ads on every piece of content you see? Want to pay a friend? You can—in our Monopoly money. Want a new feature? Submit a request to our Support Center and we'll totally maybe think about it. Want to backup a photo? You can—inside our walled garden, which only we (and the NSA, of course) can access. Just be careful what you share, because merely locking you out of your account and deleting all your data is far from the worst thing we could do. You rationalize this: "MEGACORP would never do such a thing; it would be bad for business." But we all know, at some level, that this state of affairs, this inversion of power, is not merely "unfortunate" or "suboptimal" – No. It is degrading. Even if MEGACORP were purely benevolent, it is degrading that we must ask its permission to talk to our friends; that we must rely on it to safeguard our treasured memories; that our digital lives are completely beholden to those who seek only to extract value from us. At the root of this issue is the centralization of data. MEGACORP can surveil you—because your emails and video chats flow through their servers. And MEGACORP can control you—because they hold your data hostage. But centralization is a solution to a technical problem: How can we make the user's data accessible from anywhere in the world, on any device? For a long time, no alternative solution to this problem was forthcoming. Today, thanks to a confluence of established techniques and recent innovations, we have solved the accessibility problem without resorting to centralization. Hashing, encryption, and erasure encoding got us most of the way, but one barrier remained: incentives. How do you incentivize an anonymous stranger to store your data? Earlier protocols like BitTorrent worked around this limitation by relying on altruism, tit-for-tat requirements, or "points" – in other words, nothing you could pay your electric bill with. Finally, in 2009, a solution appeared: Bitcoin. Not long after, Sia was born. Cryptography has unleashed the latent power of the internet by enabling interactions between mutually-distrustful parties. Sia harnesses this power to turn the cloud storage market into a proper marketplace, where buyers and sellers can transact directly, with no intermediaries, anywhere in the world. No more silos or walled gardens: your data is encrypted, so it can't be spied on, and it's stored on many servers, so no single entity can hold it hostage. Thanks to projects like Sia, the internet is being re-decentralized. Sia began its life as a startup, which means it has always been subjected to two competing forces: the ideals of its founders, and the profit motive inherent to all businesses. Its founders have taken great pains to never compromise on the former, but this often threatened the company's financial viability. With the establishment of the Sia Foundation, this tension is resolved. The Foundation, freed of the obligation to generate profit, is a pure embodiment of the ideals from which Sia originally sprung. The goals and responsibilities of the Foundation are numerous: to maintain core Sia protocols and consensus code; to support developers building on top of Sia and its protocols; to promote Sia and facilitate partnerships in other spheres and communities; to ensure that users can easily acquire and safely store siacoins; to develop network scalability solutions; to implement hardforks and lead the community through them; and much more. In a broader sense, its mission is to commoditize data storage, making it cheap, ubiquitous, and accessible to all, without compromising privacy or performance. Sia is a perfect example of how we can achieve better living through cryptography. We now begin a new chapter in Sia's history. May our stewardship lead it into a bright future.
Today, we are proposing the creation of the Sia Foundation: a new non-profit entity that builds and supports distributed cloud storage infrastructure, with a specific focus on the Sia storage platform. What follows is an informal overview of the Sia Foundation, covering two major topics: how the Foundation will be funded, and what its funds will be used for.
The Sia Foundation will be structured as a non-profit entity incorporated in the United States, likely a 501(c)(3) organization or similar. The actions of the Foundation will be constrained by its charter, which formalizes the specific obligations and overall mission outlined in this document. The charter will be updated on an annual basis to reflect the current goals of the Sia community. The organization will be operated by a board of directors, initially comprising Luke Champine as President and Eddie Wang as Chairman. Luke Champine will be leaving his position at Nebulous to work at the Foundation full-time, and will seek to divest his shares of Nebulous stock along with other potential conflicts of interest. Neither Luke nor Eddie personally own any siafunds or significant quantities of siacoin.
The primary source of funding for the Foundation will come from a new block subsidy. Following a hardfork, 30 KS per block will be allocated to the "Foundation Fund," continuing in perpetuity. The existing 30 KS per block miner reward is not affected. Additionally, one year's worth of block subsidies (approximately 1.57 GS) will be allocated to the Fund immediately upon activation of the hardfork. As detailed below, the Foundation will provably burn any coins that it cannot meaningfully spend. As such, the 30 KS subsidy should be viewed as a maximum. This allows the Foundation to grow alongside Sia without requiring additional hardforks. The Foundation will not be funded to any degree by the possession or sale of siafunds. Siafunds were originally introduced as a means of incentivizing growth, and we still believe in their effectiveness: a siafund holder wants to increase the amount of storage on Sia as much as possible. While the Foundation obviously wants Sia to succeed, its driving force should be its charter. Deriving significant revenue from siafunds would jeopardize the Foundation's impartiality and focus. Ultimately, we want the Foundation to act in the best interests of Sia, not in growing its own budget.
The Foundation inherits a great number of responsibilities from Nebulous. Each quarter, the Foundation will publish the progress it has made over the past quarter, and list the responsibilities it intends to prioritize over the coming quarter. This will be accompanied by a financial report, detailing each area of expenditure over the past quarter, and forecasting expenditures for the coming quarter. Below, we summarize some of the myriad responsibilities towards which the Foundation is expected to allocate its resources.
Maintain and enhance core Sia software
Arguably, this is the most important responsibility of the Foundation. At the heart of Sia is its consensus algorithm: regardless of other differences, all Sia software must agree upon the content and rules of the blockchain. It is therefore crucial that the algorithm be stewarded by an entity that is accountable to the community, transparent in its decision-making, and has no profit motive or other conflicts of interest. Accordingly, Sia’s consensus functionality will no longer be directly maintained by Nebulous. Instead, the Foundation will release and maintain an implementation of a "minimal Sia full node," comprising the Sia consensus algorithm and P2P networking code. The source code will be available in a public repository, and signed binaries will be published for each release. Other parties may use this code to provide alternative full node software. For example, Nebulous may extend the minimal full node with wallet, renter, and host functionality. The source code of any such implementation may be submitted to the Foundation for review. If the code passes review, the Foundation will provide "endorsement signatures" for the commit hash used and for binaries compiled internally by the Foundation. Specifically, these signatures assert that the Foundation believes the software contains no consensus-breaking changes or other modifications to imported Foundation code. Endorsement signatures and Foundation-compiled binaries may be displayed and distributed by the receiving party, along with an appropriate disclaimer. A minimal full node is not terribly useful on its own; the wallet, renter, host, and other extensions are what make Sia a proper developer platform. Currently, the only implementations of these extensions are maintained by Nebulous. The Foundation will contract Nebulous to ensure that these extensions continue to receive updates and enhancements. Later on, the Foundation intends to develop its own implementations of these extensions and others. As with the minimal node software, these extensions will be open source and available in public repositories for use by any Sia node software. With the consensus code now managed by the Foundation, the task of implementing and orchestrating hardforks becomes its responsibility as well. When the Foundation determines that a hardfork is necessary (whether through internal discussion or via community petition), a formal proposal will be drafted and submitted for public review, during which arguments for and against the proposal may be submitted to a public repository. During this time, the hardfork code will be implemented, either by Foundation employees or by external contributors working closely with the Foundation. Once the implementation is finished, final arguments will be heard. The Foundation board will then vote whether to accept or reject the proposal, and announce their decision along with appropriate justification. Assuming the proposal was accepted, the Foundation will announce the block height at which the hardfork will activate, and will subsequently release source code and signed binaries that incorporate the hardfork code. Regardless of the Foundation's decision, it is the community that ultimately determines whether a fork is accepted or rejected – nothing can change that. Foundation node software will never automatically update, so all forks must be explicitly adopted by users. Furthermore, the Foundation will provide replay and wipeout protection for its hard forks, protecting other chains from unintended or malicious reorgs. Similarly, the Foundation will ensure that any file contracts formed prior to a fork activation will continue to be honored on both chains until they expire. Finally, the Foundation also intends to pursue scalability solutions for the Sia blockchain. In particular, work has already begun on an implementation of Utreexo, which will greatly reduce the space requirements of fully-validating nodes (allowing a full node to be run on a smartphone) while increasing throughput and decreasing initial sync time. A hardfork implementing Utreexo will be submitted to the community as per the process detailed above. As this is the most important responsibility of the Foundation, it will receive a significant portion of the Foundation’s budget, primarily in the form of developer salaries and contracting agreements.
Support community services
We intend to allocate 25% of the Foundation Fund towards the community. This allocation will be held and disbursed in the form of siacoins, and will pay for grants, bounties, hackathons, and other community-driven endeavours. Any community-run service, such as a Skynet portal, explorer or web wallet, may apply to have its costs covered by the Foundation. Upon approval, the Foundation will reimburse expenses incurred by the service, subject to the exact terms agreed to. The intent of these grants is not to provide a source of income, but rather to make such services "break even" for their operators, so that members of the community can enrich the Sia ecosystem without worrying about the impact on their own finances.
Ensure easy acquisition and storage of siacoins
Most users will acquire their siacoins via an exchange. The Foundation will provide support to Sia-compatible exchanges, and pursue relevant integrations at its discretion, such as Coinbase's new Rosetta standard. The Foundation may also release DEX software that enables trading cryptocurrencies without the need for a third party. (The Foundation itself will never operate as a money transmitter.) Increasingly, users are storing their cryptocurrency on hardware wallets. The Foundation will maintain the existing Ledger Nano S integration, and pursue further integrations at its discretion. Of course, all hardware wallets must be paired with software running on a computer or smartphone, so the Foundation will also develop and/or maintain client-side wallet software, including both full-node wallets and "lite" wallets. Community-operated wallet services, i.e. web wallets, may be funded via grants. Like core software maintenance, this responsibility will be funded in the form of developer salaries and contracting agreements.
Protect the ecosystem
When it comes to cryptocurrency security, patching software vulnerabilities is table stakes; there are significant legal and social threats that we must be mindful of as well. As such, the Foundation will earmark a portion of its fund to defend the community from legal action. The Foundation will also safeguard the network from 51% attacks and other threats to network security by implementing softforks and/or hardforks where necessary. The Foundation also intends to assist in the development of a new FOSS software license, and to solicit legal memos on various Sia-related matters, such as hosting in the United States and the EU. In a broader sense, the establishment of the Foundation makes the ecosystem more robust by transferring core development to a more neutral entity. Thanks to its funding structure, the Foundation will be immune to various forms of pressure that for-profit companies are susceptible to.
Drive adoption of Sia
Although the overriding goal of the Foundation is to make Sia the best platform it can be, all that work will be in vain if no one uses the platform. There are a number of ways the Foundation can promote Sia and get it into the hands of potential users and developers. In-person conferences are understandably far less popular now, but the Foundation can sponsor and/or participate in virtual conferences. (In-person conferences may be held in the future, permitting circumstances.) Similarly, the Foundation will provide prizes for hackathons, which may be organized by community members, Nebulous, or the Foundation itself. Lastly, partnerships with other companies in the cryptocurrency space—or the cloud storage space—are a great way to increase awareness of Sia. To handle these responsibilities, one of the early priorities of the Foundation will be to hire a marketing director.
The Foundation Fund will be controlled by a multisig address. Each member of the Foundation's board will control one of the signing keys, with the signature threshold to be determined once the final composition of the board is known. (This threshold may also be increased or decreased if the number of board members changes.) Additionally, one timelocked signing key will be controlled by David Vorick. This key will act as a “dead man’s switch,” to be used in the event of an emergency that prevents Foundation board members from reaching the signature threshold. The timelock ensures that this key cannot be used unless the Foundation fails to sign a transaction for several months. On the 1st of each month, the Foundation will use its keys to transfer all siacoins in the Fund to two new addresses. The first address will be controlled by a high-security hot wallet, and will receive approximately one month's worth of Foundation expenditures. The second address, receiving the remaining siacoins, will be a modified version of the source address: specifically, it will increase the timelock on David Vorick's signing key by one month. Any other changes to the set of signing keys, such as the arrival or departure of board members, will be incorporated into this address as well. The Foundation Fund is allocated in SC, but many of the Foundation's expenditures must be paid in USD or other fiat currency. Accordingly, the Foundation will convert, at its discretion, a portion of its monthly withdrawals to fiat currency. We expect this conversion to be primarily facilitated by private "OTC" sales to accredited investors. The Foundation currently has no plans to speculate in cryptocurrency or other assets. Finally, it is important that the Foundation adds value to the Sia platform well in excess of the inflation introduced by the block subsidy. For this reason, the Foundation intends to provably burn, on a quarterly basis, any coins that it cannot allocate towards any justifiable expense. In other words, coins will be burned whenever doing so provides greater value to the platform than any other use. Furthermore, the Foundation will cap its SC treasury at 5% of the total supply, and will cap its USD treasury at 4 years’ worth of predicted expenses. Addendum: Hardfork Timeline We would like to see this proposal finalized and accepted by the community no later than September 30th. A new version of siad, implementing the hardfork, will be released no later than October 15th. The hardfork will activate at block 293220, which is expected to occur around 12pm EST on January 1st, 2021.
Addendum: Inflation specifics The total supply of siacoins as of January 1st, 2021 will be approximately 45.243 GS. The initial subsidy of 1.57 GS thus increases the supply by 3.47%, and the total annual inflation in 2021 will be at most 10.4% (if zero coins are burned). In 2022, total annual inflation will be at most 6.28%, and will steadily decrease in subsequent years.
We see the establishment of the Foundation as an important step in the maturation of the Sia project. It provides the ecosystem with a sustainable source of funding that can be exclusively directed towards achieving Sia's ambitious goals. Compared to other projects with far deeper pockets, Sia has always punched above its weight; once we're on equal footing, there's no telling what we'll be able to achieve. Nevertheless, we do not propose this change lightly, and have taken pains to ensure that the Foundation will act in accordance with the ideals that this community shares. It will operate transparently, keep inflation to a minimum, and respect the user's fundamental role in decentralized systems. We hope that everyone in the community will consider this proposal carefully, and look forward to a productive discussion.
This question is (understandably) asked all the time by people coming to the BCHN telegram for clarity on what has become a pretty unclear situation. It's not an easy question to answer, though, so I wanted to make this post that people could refer to. Here's my take on answering that question: It's impossible to know 100% for sure if there will be a split, because it's impossible to know for sure how all the relevant parties will behave. For there to be a split, two node implementations need to irreconcilably disagree on a consensus-related issue, both need to release code with those conflicting consensus rules, and then miners need to also be split enough on the issue for both chains to have enough hashpower to be viable. The narrative that there is ALMOST DEFINITELY going to be a split seems to have been dumped on us out of nowhere a month or so ago, along with what I consider to be increasingly unreasonable behavior from Bitcoin ABC. The tin foil hat in my heart finds that suspicious. (And between the IFP and recent Grasberg proposal, it almost seems like ABC is doing it's best to propose things that make a split as likely as possible.) This political baggage doesn't really matter though, in the grand scheme of things. What matters is that BCHN is, as far as I can tell, just trying to be a reasonable and professional node implementation for Bitcoin Cash. If sticking to those principals leads to a divergence from ABC on a consensus related issue, whatever issue that actually would end up being, then that's how it will be. And it wouldn't be the case that "BCHN split the chain", nor would it be the case that "ABC split the chain". It would just be the case that two groups released node implementations with different consensus rules from each other. (And then, if a non-negligible amount of hashpower mines using both clients, then there would indeed be a chain split caused by that situation.) Keeping BCH unified is obviously a HUGE priority for BCHN. Their initial release of what was effectively a non-IFP version of Bitcoin ABC was even designed so that, if the IFP activated with a majority of the hashpower, miners mining with BCHN would follow that longer chain, instead of rejecting IFP blocks as "invalid" or anything like that. This is in stark contrast to the narrative I've seen flooding this sub recently with claims that BCHN tried to split the chain this past upgrade, and are trying to split the chain again this November. So please take the time to consider which sides of these inevitable disagreements are being reasonable, and which are not, make sure to fact check and ask for sources for any claims you see being made that you can't verify or debunk on your own, and remember that, while chain splits are messy unfortunate things (at least in the short term), if there's an irreconcilable disagreement, it's definitely better for those parties to go their separate ways. I hope that that doesn't have to happen anytime soon for BCH.
Meter.ioaims to create a low volatile currency following 10 kwh electricity price. Meter uses a hybrid PoW/PoS solution; PoW mining for stable coin creation and PoS for txn ordering
MTR is stablecoin soft pegged around the global competitive price of 10 kwh electricity
MTRG is the finite supply governance token, which is used by PoS validators to validate transactions.
Pow mining in Meter is as open and decentralized as in Bitcoin but differs from that in Bitcoin in two fundamental ways
Block rewards are dynamic. It’s determined as a function of pow difficulty. The wining Meter miner will earn more MTR if hash rate is high and less MTR if hash rate is low, ensuring a stable cost of production for each MTR at 10 kWh electricity price using mainstream mining equipment
Miner’s don’t validate transactions. They simply compete to solve PoW. Txn ordering is done by PoS validators who secure the network and in return earn txn fees.
All stablecoins must essentialy have stability mechanisms to account for cases where demand is high and where demand is low. MTR has 2 stability mechanisms set to solve this mission. Supply side stability mechanism (long term) First and foremost MTR can’t be produced out of thin air. It’s issuance follows a disciplined monetary policy that solely depends on profit seeking behavior of miners. The only way to issue MTR is via PoW mining. When miners notice that price of MTR is getting higher than the cost to produce them (remember cost of production is always fixed at 10 kwh elec. price = around 0.9-1.2 usd) they will turn on their equipment and start creating new supply. If demand keeps increasing more miners will join, and more MTR will be printed to keep up with demand. Eventually supply will outperfrom the demand and price will get back to equilibrium. When demand is low and MTR price is dropping below 10 kwh elec. price miners will not risk their profit margin to shrink and switch to mine other coins instead of MTR. In return MTR production will stop and no additional MTR will enter circulation. Given that mining is a competitive, open enviroment, price of MTR will eventually equal to the cost to produce it. (Marginal Revenue = Marginal Cost). The long term stability is achieved through this unique and simple mechanism at layer 1 which doesn’t require use of capital inefficient collateral, complicated oracles, seignorage shares or algorithmic rebasing mechanisms. Relative to nation based fiat currencies, switching cost between crytocurrencies is significantly lower. Sudden demand changes in crypto is therefore very common and must be addressed. Huge drop in demand may temporarly cause MTR to get traded below it’s cost of production making pow mining a losing game. How can the system recover from that and restart production? On the contrary, a sudden increase in demand may cause MTR to get traded at a premium making mining temporarly very profitable. Meter has a second layer stability mechanism in order to absorb sudden demand changes. Demand side stability mechanism (short term) An on chain auction (will become live in October 2020) resets every 24 hours offering newly minted fixed number of MTRGs in exchange for bids in MTR. Participants bid at no specific price and at the end of auction recieve MTRG proportional to their percentage of total bid. The main purpose of this auction is to consume MTR. A portion of MTR (initally %60) that is bidded in the auction ends up going to a reserve that is collectively owned by MTRG holders, essentially getting out of circulation. Future use of MTR in Reserve can be decided by governance. The remaining %40 gets gradually distributed to PoS validators as block rewards. This reserve allocation ratio can be adjusted via governance depending on the amount of MTR needed to be removed out of circulation at any point in time. Meter team working to make Meter compatible with other blockchain. In fact both MTR and MTRG can currently be 1:1 bridged to their Ethereum versions as eMTR and eMTRG respectively. In near term, stablecoin MTR is set out on a mission to serve as collateral and a crypto native unit of account for DeFi.
Maybe it's time to discuss bitcoin's history again. Credit to u/singularity87 for the original post over 3 years ago. People should get the full story of bitcoin because it is probably one of the strangest of all reddit subs. bitcoin, the main sub for the bitcoin community is held and run by a person who goes by the pseudonym u/theymos. Theymos not only controls bitcoin, but also bitcoin.org and bitcointalk.com. These are top three communication channels for the bitcoin community, all controlled by just one person. For most of bitcoin's history this did not create a problem (at least not an obvious one anyway) until around mid 2015. This happened to be around the time a new player appeared on the scene, a for-profit company called Blockstream. Blockstream was made up of/hired many (but not all) of the main bitcoin developers. (To be clear, Blockstream was founded before mid 2015 but did not become publicly active until then). A lot of people, including myself, tried to point out there we're some very serious potential conflicts of interest that could arise when one single company controls most of the main developers for the biggest decentralised and distributed cryptocurrency. There were a lot of unknowns but people seemed to give them the benefit of the doubt because they were apparently about to release some new software called "sidechains" that could offer some benefits to the network. Not long after Blockstream came on the scene the issue of bitcoin's scalability once again came to forefront of the community. This issue came within the community a number of times since bitcoins inception. Bitcoin, as dictated in the code, cannot handle any more than around 3 transactions per second at the moment. To put that in perspective Paypal handles around 15 transactions per second on average and VISA handles something like 2000 transactions per second. The discussion in the community has been around how best to allow bitcoin to scale to allow a higher number of transactions in a given amount of time. I suggest that if anyone is interested in learning more about this problem from a technical angle, they go to btc and do a search. It's a complex issue but for many who have followed bitcoin for many years, the possible solutions seem relatively obvious. Essentially, currently the limit is put in place in just a few lines of code. This was not originally present when bitcoin was first released. It was in fact put in place afterwards as a measure to stop a bloating attack on the network. Because all bitcoin transactions have to be stored forever on the bitcoin network, someone could theoretically simply transmit a large number of transactions which would have to be stored by the entire network forever. When bitcoin was released, transactions were actually for free as the only people running the network were enthusiasts. In fact a single bitcoin did not even have any specific value so it would be impossible set a fee value. This meant that a malicious person could make the size of the bitcoin ledger grow very rapidly without much/any cost which would stop people from wanting to join the network due to the resource requirements needed to store it, which at the time would have been for very little gain. Towards the end of the summer last year, this bitcoin scaling debate surfaced again as it was becoming clear that the transaction limit for bitcoin was semi regularly being reached and that it would not be long until it would be regularly hit and the network would become congested. This was a very serious issue for a currency. Bitcoin had made progress over the years to the point of retailers starting to offer it as a payment option. Bitcoin companies like, Microsoft, Paypal, Steam and many more had began to adopt it. If the transaction limit would be constantly maxed out, the network would become unreliable and slow for users. Users and businesses would not be able to make a reliable estimate when their transaction would be confirmed by the network. Users, developers and businesses (which at the time was pretty much the only real bitcoin subreddit) started to discuss how we should solve the problem bitcoin. There was significant support from the users and businesses behind a simple solution put forward by the developer Gavin Andreesen. Gavin was the lead developer after Satoshi Nakamoto left bitcoin and he left it in his hands. Gavin initially proposed a very simple solution of increasing the limit which was to change the few lines of code to increase the maximum number of transactions that are allowed. For most of bitcoin's history the transaction limit had been set far far higher than the number of transactions that could potentially happen on the network. The concept of increasing the limit one time was based on the fact that history had proven that no issue had been cause by this in the past. A certain group of bitcoin developers decided that increasing the limit by this amount was too much and that it was dangerous. They said that the increased use of resources that the network would use would create centralisation pressures which could destroy the network. The theory was that a miner of the network with more resources could publish many more transactions than a competing small miner could handle and therefore the network would tend towards few large miners rather than many small miners. The group of developers who supported this theory were all developers who worked for the company Blockstream. The argument from people in support of increasing the transaction capacity by this amount was that there are always inherent centralisation pressure with bitcoin mining. For example miners who can access the cheapest electricity will tend to succeed and that bigger miners will be able to find this cheaper electricity easier. Miners who have access to the most efficient computer chips will tend to succeed and that larger miners are more likely to be able to afford the development of them. The argument from Gavin and other who supported increasing the transaction capacity by this method are essentially there are economies of scale in mining and that these economies have far bigger centralisation pressures than increased resource cost for a larger number of transactions (up to the new limit proposed). For example, at the time the total size of the blockchain was around 50GB. Even for the cost of a 500GB SSD is only $150 and would last a number of years. This is in-comparison to the $100,000's in revenue per day a miner would be making. Various developers put forth various other proposals, including Gavin Andresen who put forth a more conservative increase that would then continue to increase over time inline with technological improvements. Some of the employees of blockstream also put forth some proposals, but all were so conservative, it would take bitcoin many decades before it could reach a scale of VISA. Even though there was significant support from the community behind Gavin's simple proposal of increasing the limit it was becoming clear certain members of the bitcoin community who were part of Blockstream were starting to become increasingly vitriolic and divisive. Gavin then teamed up with one of the other main bitcoin developers Mike Hearn and released a coded (i.e. working) version of the bitcoin software that would only activate if it was supported by a significant majority of the network. What happened next was where things really started to get weird. After this free and open source software was released, Theymos, the person who controls all the main communication channels for the bitcoin community implemented a new moderation policy that disallowed any discussion of this new software. Specifically, if people were to discuss this software, their comments would be deleted and ultimately they would be banned temporarily or permanently. This caused chaos within the community as there was very clear support for this software at the time and it seemed our best hope for finally solving the problem and moving on. Instead a censorship campaign was started. At first it 'all' they were doing was banning and removing discussions but after a while it turned into actively manipulating the discussion. For example, if a thread was created where there was positive sentiment for increasing the transaction capacity or being negative about the moderation policies or negative about the actions of certain bitcoin developers, the mods of bitcoin would selectively change the sorting order of threads to 'controversial' so that the most support opinions would be sorted to the bottom of the thread and the most vitriolic would be sorted to the top of the thread. This was initially very transparent as it was possible to see that the most downvoted comments were at the top and some of the most upvoted were at the bottom. So they then implemented hiding the voting scores next to the users name. This made impossible to work out the sentiment of the community and when combined with selectively setting the sorting order to controversial it was possible control what information users were seeing. Also, due to the very very large number of removed comments and users it was becoming obvious the scale of censorship going on. To hide this they implemented code in their CSS for the sub that completely hid comments that they had removed so that the censorship itself was hidden. Anyone in support of scaling bitcoin were removed from the main communication channels. Theymos even proudly announced that he didn't care if he had to remove 90% of the users. He also later acknowledged that he knew he had the ability to block support of this software using the control he had over the communication channels. While this was all going on, Blockstream and it's employees started lobbying the community by paying for conferences about scaling bitcoin, but with the very very strange rule that no decisions could be made and no complete solutions could be proposed. These conferences were likely strategically (and successfully) created to stunt support for the scaling software Gavin and Mike had released by forcing the community to take a "lets wait and see what comes from the conferences" kind of approach. Since no final solutions were allowed at these conferences, they only served to hinder and splinter the communities efforts to find a solution. As the software Gavin and Mike released called BitcoinXT gained support it started to be attacked. Users of the software were attack by DDOS. Employees of Blockstream were recommending attacks against the software, such as faking support for it, to only then drop support at the last moment to put the network in disarray. Blockstream employees were also publicly talking about suing Gavin and Mike from various different angles simply for releasing this open source software that no one was forced to run. In the end Mike Hearn decided to leave due to the way many members of the bitcoin community had treated him. This was due to the massive disinformation campaign against him on bitcoin. One of the many tactics that are used against anyone who does not support Blockstream and the bitcoin developers who work for them is that you will be targeted in a smear campaign. This has happened to a number of individuals and companies who showed support for scaling bitcoin. Theymos has threatened companies that he will ban any discussion of them on the communication channels he controls (i.e. all the main ones) for simply running software that he disagrees with (i.e. any software that scales bitcoin). As time passed, more and more proposals were offered, all against the backdrop of ever increasing censorship in the main bitcoin communication channels. It finally come down the smallest and most conservative solution. This solution was much smaller than even the employees of Blockstream had proposed months earlier. As usual there was enormous attacks from all sides and the most vocal opponents were the employees of Blockstream. These attacks still are ongoing today. As this software started to gain support, Blockstream organised more meetings, especially with the biggest bitcoin miners and made a pact with them. They promised that they would release code that would offer an on-chain scaling solution hardfork within about 4 months, but if the miners wanted this they would have to commit to running their software and only their software. The miners agreed and the ended up not running the most conservative proposal possible. This was in February last year. There is no hardfork proposal in sight from the people who agreed to this pact and bitcoin is still stuck with the exact same transaction limit it has had since the limit was put in place about 6 years ago. Gavin has also been publicly smeared by the developers at Blockstream and a plot was made against him to have him removed from the development team. Gavin has now been, for all intents an purposes, expelled from bitcoin development. This has meant that all control of bitcoin development is in the hands of the developers working at Blockstream. There is a new proposal that offers a market based approach to scaling bitcoin. This essentially lets the market decide. Of course, as usual there has been attacks against it, and verbal attacks from the employees of Blockstream. This has the biggest chance of gaining wide support and solving the problem for good. To give you an idea of Blockstream; It has hired most of the main and active bitcoin developers and is now synonymous with the "Core" bitcoin development team. They AFAIK no products at all. They have received around $75m in funding. Every single thing they do is supported by theymos. They have started implementing an entirely new economic system for bitcoin against the will of it's users and have blocked any and all attempts to scaling the network in line with the original vision. Although this comment is ridiculously long, it really only covers the tip of the iceberg. You could write a book on the last two years of bitcoin. The things that have been going on have been mind blowing. One last thing that I think is worth talking about is the u/bashco's claim of vote manipulation. The users that the video talks about have very very large numbers of downvotes mostly due to them having a very very high chance of being astroturfers. Around about the same time last year when Blockstream came active on the scene every single bitcoin troll disappeared, and I mean literally every single one. In the years before that there were a large number of active anti-bitcoin trolls. They even have an active sub buttcoin. Up until last year you could go down to the bottom of pretty much any thread in bitcoin and see many of the usual trolls who were heavily downvoted for saying something along the lines of "bitcoin is shit", "You guys and your tulips" etc. But suddenly last year they all disappeared. Instead a new type of bitcoin user appeared. Someone who said they were fully in support of bitcoin but they just so happened to support every single thing Blockstream and its employees said and did. They had the exact same tone as the trolls who had disappeared. Their way to talking to people was aggressive, they'd call people names, they had a relatively poor understanding of how bitcoin fundamentally worked. They were extremely argumentative. These users are the majority of the list of that video. When the 10's of thousands of users were censored and expelled from bitcoin they ended up congregating in btc. The strange thing was that the users listed in that video also moved over to btc and spend all day everyday posting troll-like comments and misinformation. Naturally they get heavily downvoted by the real users in btc. They spend their time constantly causing as much drama as possible. At every opportunity they scream about "censorship" in btc while they are happy about the censorship in bitcoin. These people are astroturfers. What someone somewhere worked out, is that all you have to do to take down a community is say that you are on their side. It is an astoundingly effective form of psychological attack.
Any Bitcoin miner who successfully hashes a block header to a value below the target threshold can add the entire block to the block chain (assuming the block is otherwise valid). These blocks are commonly addressed by their block height —the number of blocks between them and the first Bitcoin block (block 0, most commonly known as the genesis block ). Auf der Sidechain können Transaktionen innerhalb dieser schließlich weitestgehend unabhängig von der Mainchain ausgeführt werden – nicht alle Nutzer bekommen also davon mit. Sendet man eine normale Bitcoin-Transaktion, wird diese von allen Teilnehmern im Netzwerk verarbeitet und somit für diese Sichtbar. Das führt bei großen Transaktionsvolumina zu Kapazitätsproblemen. Nutzt man ... For a sidechain miner with >50% hashpower on the sidechain, if B > F * (N + D), the sidechain miner should steal the sidechain's entire backing fund. Theft is done by creating an invalid sidechain block with a withdrawal of the entire B to a mainchain address the thief control, and creating a sequence of block headers long enough to cause the mainchain Bitcoin to accept it as an SPV proof and ... A sidechain won’t stop the value of Bitcoin waxing and waning, but it will allow me to not worry about the settlement times to the main blockchain so that I can smooth my business. I might then decide to fluctuate the amount of coin needed, rather than the amount of fiat needed to purchase items. At that point, I can decide whether to sell off the coin or retain for future gains in value. However, as argued by Bitcoin developer Peter Todd, the concept of merge-mining does have one very important security flaw: unless the majority of Bitcoin miners agree to merge-mine a particular chain, that chain is arguably not secure at all. To understand why, first consider the case of a more traditional altcoin, in our example running SHA256 for simplicity (if the altcoin uses a custom ...
# Criticisms of Sidechain security by Peter Todd: 1. SPV proof security is weaker than full blockchain verification 2. Sidechain mining via merge mining tends towards large mining pools and ... Bitcoin Mining Explained - Duration: 10:24. Digital Gold 560,366 views. 10:24. Chase Bank Closes My Business Account after Selling Bitcoin with Cash Payments! - Duration: 15:45. ... What is Bitcoin Mining? (In Plain English) - Duration: 16:01. 99Bitcoins 401,370 views. 16:01 . Sidechains Explained [Rootstock RSK] (Litecoin/Bitcoin) - Duration: 4:10. Franklyn [Crypto] 12,322 ... Mining is the invention which makes Bitcoin possible. But -- to what extent, do attributes *of* mining, become attributes of the larger Bitcoin cryptosystem? The magic of mining is that "anyone ... Elastos has on average 60% of the Bitcoin miners hashrate securing its ecosystem alongside its own supernodes! The Elastos Internet OS is in-fact more secure...